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Abstract 
The usual sequential multi-signature scheme allows the multi-signers to sign the document with 
their own information and sequence, and the signature is not real random and secure. The paper analyzes 
the reasons for the insecurity of the previous multi-signature scheme, and puts forward a Genuine Random 
Sequential Multi-signature Scheme based on The Waters signature scheme, and the experiment proves 
that this scheme is a good scheme suitable for the practical application with high computing efficiency.  
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1. Introduction 
The paper analyzes the reasons for the insecurity of the previous multi-signature 
scheme, and puts forward a Genuine Random Sequential Multi-signature Scheme based on 
The Waters signature scheme, and the experiment proves that this scheme is a good scheme 
suitable for the practical application with high computing efficiency 
A multi-signature.scheme allows n different Signers to jointly sign the same document, 
yielding a multi-signature of roughly the same size as a standard signature. A verifier is 
convinced that each signer participated in signing. By transmitting a multi-signature instead of n 
individual signatures, multi-signature schemes can greatly save on communication costs. 
Mihir Bellare and Gregory Neven[1] for an Identity based multi-signature scheme from 
RSA. Craig and Zulfikar Ramzan[2] also for an identity-based multi-signature scheme. 
Alexandra Boldyreva et al.[5] propose a new primitive that they call ordered multi-signatures and 
a formal security model for ordered multi-signatures. “The ordered multi-signatures produces a 
compact multi-signatures, uses constant-size keys, is ‘sequential’ in that signers sign one after 
another and no further interaction among  
Comparing to the “structured” signatures [13], the ordered multi-signatures scheme in 
[5] is in the noninteractive setting. It is practical. Provable security is the basic requirement for 
signature schemes. Alexandra Boldyreva et al.[5] proved ordered multisignature scheme secure 
in the random  
Alexandra Boldyreva et al.[3] propose a new primitive that they call ordered multi-
signatures and a formal security model for ordered multi-signatures. “The ordered multi-
signatures produce compact multi-signatures use constant-size keys, are ‘sequential’ in that 
signers sign one after another and no further interaction among Comparing to the “structured” 
signatures [4], the ordered multi-signatures scheme in [3] is in the noninteractive setting. It is 
practical. 
Provable security is the basic requirement for signature schemes. Alexandra Boldyreva 
et al.[3] proved ordered multisignature scheme secure in the random the paper analyzes the 
reasons for the insecurity of the previous multi-signature scheme, and puts forward a Genuine 
Random Sequential Multi-signature Scheme based on The Waters signature scheme, and the 
experiment proves that this scheme is a good scheme suitable for the practical application with 
high computing efficiency 
Commitment scheme is a basic building block and has diverse applications to 
cryptographic proto-cols, especially to zero-knowledge proofs[14]. Informally, a commitment 
scheme is a two-stage protocol between a sender and a receiver. In the first stage, the sender 
commits to a value b, and in the second, the sender  'reveal' this value to the receiver. We want 
two security properties from a commitment scheme. The hiding property says that the receiver 
does not learn anything about the value b during the commit stage. And the binding property 
says that after the commit stage there is at most one value that the sender can successfully 
                     ISSN: 2089-3191 
Buletin TEI  Vol. 3, No. 1,  March 2014 :  55 – 68 
56
open. According to the computational power of senders and receivers, commitments can be 
classified into several possible types [15]. In this paper, we mainly focus on construction of 
perfectly hiding and computationally binding commitment (PHCBC). 
Some works about perfectly hiding commitment: Construction of PHCBC is an attractive 
problem. PHCBC s with a constant number of rounds were shown exist based on specific 
number-theoretic assumptions (or, more generally, based on any collection of claw-free per-
mutations with an efficiently-recognizable index set ), and collision-resistant hash function [16]. 
Protocols with higher round complexity were shown to exist based on different types one-way 
functions. Protocols with O( n/ log  n) rounds were based on one-way permutations [17] and 
regular one-way functions [18]. Finally, a protocol with a polynomial number of rounds was 
based on any one-way function [19]. in [20]O ( n / log n) rounds were shown to be the tight 
lower bound on the rounds complexity of PHCBC. 
The Problem: It is not known whether PHCBC in constant rounds constructed can be 
achieved with one-way function or one-way permutation.There are many so-called "atomic" ZK 
protocols for NP that achieve constant error-probability in constant (three or four) moves [22]. 
Serial repetition lowers the error and preserves ZK, but at the cost of increasing the number of 
rounds to non-constant. So we would like to do parallel repetition. However, this is ruled out: 
first, we have the above mentioned results of [23]; second, the latter also showed that in general 
parallel repetition does not preserve ZK. So one must build low error ZK protocols directly [24]. 
 
 
2. Preliminaries 
2.1. NP Relations 
NP relations We say that a binary relation  
 
R  0 , 1     0 , 1   
 
is an NP relation if there exists a polynomial p(.)such that for any  
 
(x, w) ∈ R, 
 
( )w p x
 
 
and in addition there exists a polynomial time Turing machine for deciding membership in R. We 
denote by LR the following: 
 
RL =   . . ,x ws t x w R   
  
We say that 
 
  LNP if L = LR 
 
for some NP relation R. 
A negligible function is a function that grows slower that inverse of any polynomial. That is, 
 
 ： N N º    
is negligible if for any positive polynomial p(¢) there exists a number 0n such that  
 
( )n < 1/p(n) 
  
 
 
for all  
n > 0n  
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One-Way Function A function 
  
f :  0 , 1     0 , 1    
 
is called one-way if the following conditions hold: 
1. There exists a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm A such that on input x, A outputs f(x); 
2. For every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A there exists a negligible 
function  such that for all sufficiently large k, it holds that 
  
Prob (x ← 0,1   
 
1( ( )) ( ( )) ( )A f x f f x k    
 
f is a one-way permutation if it is a 1-1 and length preserving one-way function. 
 
2.2. Commitment scheme 
Definition 1 (Gen, Com, Ver) is a commitment scheme[11] if: 
a. Efficiency: Gen, Com and Ver are polynomial-time algorithms; 
b. Completeness: for all m it holds that 
 
Prob (crs ← Gen (1k ); 
  
(com, de c)←Com( crs , m); 
 
Ver (crs, com, de c , m)=1)=1 
 
c. Binding: for any polynomial-time algorithm sender there is a negligible function º such that for 
all sufficiently large k  it holds that  
 
Prob( crs ← Gen (1k ) 
 
(com, 0m , 1m ,de 0c ,de 1c ) ←Sender (crs) 
  
0m ≠ 1m  and  
 
Ver(crs, com, d 0c , 0m )，Ver(crs,com,dec1, 1m )=1)≤ (k) 
 
d. Hiding: for any adversary receiver there is a negligible function º su that for all 0m ; 1m  
 where 
  
0m = 1m  
  
and all sufficiently large k it holds that 
 
Prob(crs←Gen(1k ); 
 
b←{0,1};(com, de c)←Crs(crs, bm ):  
 
b ← receiver (com))<1/2 + (k) 
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The "hiding" and "binding" of the above definitions are "computationally hiding" and 
"computationally binding" respectively A commitment is perfectly hiding if for any 
computationally unbounded adversary receiver for all 0m ; 1m   
where  
 
0m = 1m  
 
and all sufficiently large k it holds that 
 
Prob(crs← Gen (1k ); 
 
b←{0,1};(com, de c)←Crs(crs, bm )  
 
b← receiver (com))<1/2  
 
A commitment is perfectly binding for any computationally unbounded sender for all sufficiently 
large k it holds that 
 
Prob(crs← Gen (1k ); 
 
(com, 0m , 1m ,de 0c ,de 1c ) ←Sender (crs):  
 
0m ≠ 1m   
 
and  
 
Ver ( crs , com, de 0c , 0m )，Ver(crs,com,dec1, 1m )=1)=0 
 
 
3. Digital Signature Schemes   and Security Model 
3.1. Digital Signature Schemes 
A signature scheme consists of the following three oracle model[6]. algorithms: a key 
generation algorithm Key Gen, a signature generation algorithm Sign and a signature 
verification algorithm Verify[7].  
Key Gen, which on input 1k ，where k is the security parameter, outputs a pair ( kp , ks ) 
of matching public and private keys. Algorithm Key Gen is probabilistic. 
Sign, which receives a message m and the private key ks , and outputs a signature 
 
 = Sign (m, ks ).  
 
The signing algorithm might be probabilistic. Verify, which receives a candidate signature , a 
message m and a public key kp , and returns an answer Verify ( kp , m, ) as to whether or not 
 is a valid signature of m with respect to kp . In general, the verification algorithm need not 
be probabilistic. 
Existential unforgeability under an adaptive chosen message attack introduced by 
Goldwasser, Micali and returns an answer Verify( kp , m, ) as to whether or not  is a valid 
signature of m with respect to kp . In general, the verification algorithm need not be 
probabilistic.valid signature of m with respect to kp . In general, the verification algorithm need 
not be probabilistic. 
Buletin TEI  ISSN: 2089-3191  
 
A Genuine Random Sequential Multi-signature Scheme (Yonglong Tang) 
59
Existential unforgeability under an adaptive chosen message attack introduced by 
Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [9], has become the standard notion of signature security. The 
security model of existential unforgeability (in the random oracle model) is defined using the 
following game between a challenger and an adversary A [5]. 
 
3.2. Security Model 
Setup the challenger runs algorithm Key Gen to obtain a public kp and private key ks . 
The adversary A is given kp . Queries proceeding adaptively, A requests signatures with kp on 
at most qs messages of his choice 
  
1N ， 2N ，…, qsN   {0, 1}* . 
 
The challenger responds to each query with a signature i = Sign ( ks , Mi ).  Algorithm A also 
adaptively asks for at most Hq queries of the random oracle H. 
Output : Eventually, A outputs a pair (M,  ) and wins the game if  
1)  M is not any of 1N ， 2N ，…, qsN . 
2)  Verify ( kp , M,  ) = valid. 
 
 
4.  Preliminaries 
4.1. Bilinear Maps [13]. 
G and GT are multiplicative cyclic groups of order p. The group action on G and TG can 
be computed efficiently;g is a generator of G ; 
 
e: G G  TG  
  
is an efficiently computable map with the following properties: 
1) Bilinear: for all u ,v   G and a , b   Z,  
 
e( au , bv ) = e ( , )abu v ; 
 
2) Non-degenerate: 
  
e (g , g)≠ GtI ,  
 
where GtI is the identity of TG . We say that G is a bilinear group if it satisfies these 
requirements. 
 
4.2. The Waters Signature Scheme 
The messages will be assumed to be bit strings of the form 0,1 k . In practice, a 
collision-resistant hash function kH :  
 
{0, 1}*  0,1 k  
 
can be used to create message of the desired length. The scheme first choose groups G and 
TG  of prime order p such that an admissible pairing  
 
e: G G  TG  
 
can be constructed and choose a random Generator 
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gG , k+1 
  
additional random generators  
 
u , 1u , 2u , … , ku   G. 
 
The Waters signature scheme consists of three algorithms as follows. Key Gen. Pick random 
 
   R pZ   
 
and set  
 
A  e ( , )g g  .  
 
The public key kp  is  
 
A   TG .  
 
the private key ks  is .Sign( ks , m). Parse the user’s private key ks as 
 
   pZ  
 
and the message m as a bitstring  
 
( 1n , 2n , … , kn ) 0,1 k , 
 
Pick a random r   R pZ  and compute 
 
1
1
i
Tk
n
i
i
g u u

      , 
  
 2
Tg   
 
 
The signature is  
 
2
1 2( , ) G     
 
Verify ( kp , m, ). Parse the user’s public kp as  
 
A  TG , 
 
the message m as a bitstring  
 
( 1n , 2n , … , kn )  0,1 k , 
 
and the signature   as  
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2
1 2( , ) G   . 
  
Verify that 
 
1( , )e g   2
1
, i
Tk
n
i
i
e u u

    = A 
 
holds if so, output valid ; if not, output invalid. This signature is existentially unforgeable under 
an adaptive chosen message attack if the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem[13] in 
bilinear groups is hard. 
 
4.3. Ordered multisignature schemes and their security 
An ordered multi-signature scheme (OMS) consists of the following four algorithms[6]. A 
parameter generation algorithm Opg that returns some global information I for the scheme. This 
algorithm can be run by a trusted third-party or standards bodies. A key generation algorithm 
Okg run by a user that on the input global information I returns a publicprivate key-pair ( kp , ks ). 
A signing algorithm OSign run by a user on inputs its secret key ks , a message n{0, 1}*, a list 
of i-1 public keys  
 
L = (p 1k ,… , p 1ik  ), 
  
and an OMS-so-far  . It returns a new OMS  , or  if the input is deemed invalid. A 
deterministic verification algorithm OVf that on inputs a list of public keys (p 1k ,,…, p nk ), a 
publicprivate key-pair ( kp , ks ). A signing algorithm OSign run by a user on inputs its secret key
ks , a message  
 
n{0, 1}*,  
 
a list of i-1 public keys 
 
L = (p 1k ,… , p 1ik  ),  
 
and an OMS-so-far  . It returns a new OMS  , or  if the input is deemed invalid. A 
deterministic verification algorithm OVf that on inputs a list of public keys (p 1k ,,…, p nk ), a 
message n, and an OMS returns valid or . The security model of OMS in [6] extends the 
notion of security for multi-signatures in [8] to also ensure authenticity of the signing order. 
Similarly to the model of [8], the users are required to prove knowledge of their secret keys 
during public-key registration with a CA. For simplicity, this is modeled by requiring an adversary 
to hand over secret keys of malicious signers. This is known as the registered-key or certified-
key model. The security model of existential unforgeability for OMS is defined using the 
following game associated to OMS and a forger A with access to an oracle. The game runs in 
three stages[11]:  
Setup the game first runs Opg to obtain output I and then generates a challenge key-
pair (pk, sk) by running Okg on input I[3]. Attack: A runs on inputs I, pk. A may query a key 
registration oracle with a key-pair ( , )pk sk   and coins c used for key generation , which 
records pkas registered if Okg(I,c) ⇒ ( , )pk sk  . (This is a simplified model of a possibly 
more-complex key registration protocol with a CA that involves proofs of knowledge of secret 
keys.) A also has access to a signing oracle OSign, which on inputs m,  , L returns if not 
all public keys in L are registered and OSign( ks , m,  , L) otherwise. Forgery: Eventually, A 
halts with outputs a list of public keys  
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L* = (p 1k *, … , p nk *),  
 
a message n*, and a purported OMS signature . This output is considered to be a forgery if it 
holds that[11] 
1)  OVf (L*, n*,  *) = valid; 
2)  p ik  *= pk  
for some 
 
i*{1, … , n}; 
 
3)  All public keys in L*except pk are registered; 
4)  A did not query, n*,  , L to its signing oracle where | 
  
L | = i*-1  
 
for any  
 {0, 1}*.[12] 
 
We define that an ordered multi-signature is (t, cq , sq ,N , ε) unforgeable if not t-time adversary 
making cq certification queries and sq signing queries can win the above game with advantage 
more than ε, where N is an upper bound on the length of the sequential signatures involved[4]. 
 
 
5. New Scheme 
5.1. Construction 
We construct an ordered multi-signature WOMS from the Waters signature. Our 
scheme is defined by the following algorithms. The messages will be assumed to be bit strings 
of the form  0 , 1 k .Parameter generation algorithm and key generation algorithm were 
produced as the Waters signature scheme. Parameter generation Opg: The algorithm first 
choose groups G and GT of prime order p such that an admissible pairing e: 
 
G G  TG  
 
 
can be constructed and choose a random generator 
 
gG, k+1  
 
additional random generators 
 
u , 1u , 2u , … , ku G. 
 
Key genetation Okg: Pick random  
 
   R pZ    
 
and set  
 
A  e ( , )g g  . 
 
The public key pk is 
  
A TG .  
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The private key ks is .Signing OSign: On inputs ski,  
 
n=( 1n , 2n , … , kn ) 0,1 k ,  
 
L = (p 1k ,… , p 1ik  ),  
 
and an OMS-so-far  ,the algorithm first verifies that OVf  
 
(L, m,  )= valid, 
 
as defined below and if not, outputs ⊥and halt. For a first signer, is defined as ( GI , GI ,
GI ). Then parseas  
 
( S  , R ,T  )G3.  
 
Choose random 
 
ir , it  pZ ,  
 
and compute 
 
S = i iitS g 
1
j
j
T
k
n
j
j
u u

    ,   
 
iTR R g ,   
 
jitT T g  
 
the signature is 
  = (S, R, T). 
 
Verification Ovf: On inputs  
 
(p 1k  ,… , p nk ),  
 
n=( 1n , 2n , … , kn ) 0,1 k ,  ,  
 
the algorithm first checks that all p 1k  ,… , p nk are distinct, if not, it output ⊥and halt. Then 
parse as (S, R, T) and verify if 
 
e S ，g
1
1
, j
k
n
j
j
e R u u


     
 
= 1A 2A … nA e (T, g) 
 
if so, output valid ; if not, output  . An ordered multisignature in our scheme has the form 
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S=
1
n
i i
i
it
g


 1
1
n
j
j
j
r
k
n
j
j
u u


    ,  
 
R=
1
n
i
i
r
g 
 ,   
 
T=
1
n
i
i
it
g 
  
 
Correctness: It is easy to see that the verification equation is satisfied: 
 
e S , g
1
1
, j
k
n
j
j
e R u u


     
 
= 1A 2A …… nA e (T, g) 
1
, j
k
n
j
j
e R u u

   
1
1
, j
k
n
j
j
e R u u


     
 
= 1A 2A …… nA e (T, g) 
 
Let iT = ( , ) ite g g , 
 
Then 
 
e(T, g) = 
1( , )
n
i
i
it
e g g
  
= 
1( , )
n
i
i
it
e g g 
  
 
=
1
n
i
i
i
T

  
 
The equation above ensures authenticity of the signing order. 
 
5.2. The security proof 
The security analysis of our scheme is similar to the analysis presented in[13]. Theorem: The 
WOMS is (t, cq , sq ,N , ε)-unforgeable if the Waters signature scheme is (t, cq , sq ,N , ε) -
unforgeable on G, where 
 
t = t +O( cq + sqN +N),  
 
q = sq  ,  
  = ε. 
Proof Suppose A is a forger algorithm that (t, cq , sq ,N , ε)-breaks our WOMS. We construct an 
algorithm B that ( t , q  ,  )-breaks the Waters signature scheme. Algorithm B is given a 
public key of the Waters signature scheme,  
Buletin TEI  ISSN: 2089-3191  
 
A Genuine Random Sequential Multi-signature Scheme (Yonglong Tang) 
65
 
A = e ( , )g g   .  
 
It interacts with A as follows. Setup algorithm B runs A supplying it with the challenge key 
 
kp = A 
  
     = e ( , )g g    
 
Certification Queries: A wish to certify some public key p k , providing also its corresponding 
private keys. A k lgorithm B checks that the private key is correct and if so, registers (p k , s k ) 
in its list of certified key pairs. OMS Signature Queries: Algorithm A requests an OMS under the 
challenge key kp  on a message m. In addition, it supplies an OMS-so-far  , a list of i-1 public 
keys  
 
L = (p 1k ,… , p 1ik  ).  
 
The simulator B first checks that the signature is valid; that each key in L has been certified; 
that the challenge key does not appear in L; and that  
 
|L| < N.  
 
B returns  if any of these conditions does not hold. Otherwise, B queries its own signing 
oracle for key kp , obtaining a signature  on message n. 
 
1 = jg
1
j
j
T
k
m
j
j
u u

    , 
2
jTg   
 
B parseas ( 1iS  , 1iR  , 1iT  ), B pick a random it R pZ , and compute 
 
iS = 1iS  1 iitg  
 
    =
1
i
h h
h
ht
g


 1
1
i
h
h
j
r
k
m
j
j
u u


     
  = (Si, Ri, Ti)  
 
is a OMS on message m under keys  
 
L = (p 1k  ,… , p 1ik  , kp ) 
 
Output Eventually, A halts, outputting a forgery 
  *= (S*, R*, T*),  
 
a message 
 
n*=( 1n *, 2n *,…, kn  *) 0,1 k ,  
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and a list of public keys 
  
L* = (p 1k * ,… , p nk *) 
 
This forgery must verify as valid under Ovf; all public key in L* except kp must have been 
certified;  
 
p ik 
 = kp   
 
for some 
  
i*{1, … , n}; 
 
  |L*| ≤N;  
 
and A did not query m*,  , L to its signing oracle where 
 
|L′| = i*-1  
 
for any  
 {0, 1}*. 
 
 
 
 
 
where S*, R*, T* is as follows. 
 
S*=
1
n
i
ig


 1
1
n
i
i
j
r
k
m
j
j
u u
 

    ，   
 
R*=
1
n
i
i
r
g 
 ,     
 
T*=
1
n
i
i
t
g 
  
 
Now, Algorithm B computes 
 
1 = S* jg    1i
i i
g



   1T  ,   
 
2 = R* 
 
i ( i i ) 
 
is the private key corresponding to each public key in L* , B can knows it by the certification 
procedure. We have 
 
e( 1 ,g) 
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So  1 , 2 is a valid Waters signature on n* under the challenge key kp  = iA   , Since A did 
not make an OMS signing query at n*, B did not make a signing query at n*, so  
 
 = 1 , 
 
2 is a nontrivial Waters signature forgery. Algorithm B outputs 
 
 = 1 , 
2 and halts.  
Algorithm B succeeds whenever A does. The running-time of B includes: 
1) Bs signing queries. B makes as many signing queries as A makes OMS signing queries 
2) B handles As certification queries. Each certification query can be handled in O(1) time 
3) B handles OMS signing queries. Each OMS signing query can be handled in O(N) time 
4) The other computations can be completed in O(N) time. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
We will construct a PHCBC in two rounds from any one-way permutation, which is a 
negation of the result in [9].  protocol is our main tool to construct PHCBC.  protocol is a 
three-move interactive protocol between the prover and the verifier in which the verifier is only 
required to send random bits as a challenge to the prover . Based on  protocol, a new method 
to construct a commitment scheme was proposed in [10]. In this paper, we will use  -protocol 
on Hamiltonian-Cycle to construct PHCBC in constant rounds (i.e., two rounds) from any one-
way permutation. 
In this paper we gave an ordered multisignature scheme which is provably secure 
without random oracles. Our construction derives from the Waters signature scheme. It is also 
an interesting problem to find an ordered aggregate signature scheme provable secure without 
random oracles. 
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